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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal by Leslie Blosch regarding certain orders set forth in the
Decree of Divorce between Albert Blosch (the Petitioner below) and Leslie
Blosch (the Respondent below). On February 24, 2004, the Honorable Rodney S.
Page of the Utah Second Judicial District Court signed the Decree of Divorce. On
February 26,2004, the Second Judicial District Court entered the Decree of
Divorce into the registry of judgments. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction
over this matter, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h).
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether this Court should reject Leslie Blosch's appeal in its

entirety, based upon her failure to properly marshal the evidence, in
regard to all of the issues she raises on appeal. Standard of Review: "To prevail
[on appeal].. [a party] must first marshal all the evidence that supports [the trial
court's findings] and then demonstrate that the evidence, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the court's ruling is insufficient..."

State ex rel. W.A.. 63

P.3d 607, 620 (Utah 2002). This Court should assume that adequate
evidence supports the trial court's findings, on a specific issue, if the appellant
fails to properly marshall evidence on an issue. Id- at 620.
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2.

Whether this Court should reject Leslie Blosch's appeal in its entirety

based upon her failure to properly brief the issues which she raises on appeal.
Standard of Review: "It is well established that a reviewing court will not address
arguments that are not adequately briefed." State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299, 304
(Utah 1998).
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in calculating the monthly
alimony award that it ordered Albert Blosch to pay over to Leslie Blosch.
Standard of Review: This Court should " . . . not disturb the trial court's award
of spousal support absent a showing of a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion."
Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
4.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in apportioning marital

property at trial, as between Albert Blosch and Leslie Blosch. Standard of
Review: "'In order to reverse the trial court's distribution of property in a divorce
action [this Court] must find that it works such a manifest injustice or inequity as
to indicate a clear abuse of discretion.'" Burge v. Facio. 88 P.3d 350, 352 (Utah
Ct. App. 2004). quoting Gibbons v. Gibbons. 656 P.2d 407,409 (Utah 1982).
5.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in calculating the

combined attorney fee award which it ordered Albert Blosch to pay over to Leslie
Blosch. Standard of Review: '"Both the decision to award attorney
fees and the amount of attorney fees are within the sound discretion of the trial
court." Griffith v.Griffith. 959 P.2d 1015,1021 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
5

6.

Whether this Court should award attorney fees to

either party in connection with this appeal. Standard of Review for Albert Blosch
to get attorney fees: The Utah Court of Appeals should award attorney fees to
Albert Blosch if he prevails, and he can demonstrate that Leslie Blosch's appeal is
frivolous. Utah Rule App. Proc. 33(a). Standard of Review for Leslie Blosch to
get attorney fees: Leslie Blosch must have received attorney fees below, and must
also prevail on the main issues on appeal. Childs v. Childs. 967 P.2d 942, 947
(Utah Ct. App. 1998).
STATUTES. RULES. AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
1.

Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(8)(a): The Court shall consider at

least the following factors in determining alimony: I) the financial condition and
needs of the recipient spouse; (ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to
produce income; (iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; (iv) the
length of the marriage; (v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of the minor
children requiring support; (vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business
owned or operated by the payor spouse; and (vii) whether the recipient spouse
directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for
education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend
school during the marriage."
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1): "When a decree of divorce is

rendered, the Court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children,
6

property, debts or obligations, and parties . . . (emphasis added)."
3.

Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(1): "In any action filed under Title 30,

Chapter 3,4, or 6 and in any action to establish an order of custody, parent time,
child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may
order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert
witness fees, of the other party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the
action. The order may include provision for costs of the action."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case:

This case arises from a divorce action between the parties, in the Second
Judicial District Court of the State of Utah. During the course of the marriage, the
parties did not have any children. As a result, the principal issues before the trial
court were alimony, marital property distribution, and attorney fees.
R

Course of the Proceedings:

1.

On July 3, 2002, Albert Blosch filed a Verified Petition for Divorce

against Leslie Blosch in the Second Judicial District Court. (See trial record at
pages 1 through 7.)
2.

On July 26, 2002, Leslie Blosch filed an Answer to Petition for

Divorce and Counter-Claim, through her first attorney of record Michael Murphy.
(See trial record at pages 21 through 30.)
7

3.

On October 7, 2002, Leslie Blosch substituted in her new attorney of

record, Denise Larkin, in the place of Michael Murphy. (See trial record at page
133.)
4.

On December 9, 2002, the parties held an initial pre-trial conference

before the Honorable David S. Dillon. (See trial record at page 166.)
5.

On February 6, 2003, the parties, through counsel, conducted

depositions of one another in Leslie Blosch's attorney's office. During the course
of the proceeding, the parties also otherwise mutually exchanged written
discovery. (See trial record at pages 203.)
6.

On February 13, 2003, the parties then held a second pre-trial

conference before the Honorable David S. Dillon. At such time, Commissioner
Dillon certified the case for a one day trial on the stipulated issues of the
apportionment of marital real property, marital personal property, the
apportionment of Albert Blosch's 401(k) plan, the apportionment of marital debts,
and the assessment of attorney fees. (See trial record at page 169.)
7.

On September 29, 2003 (after various continuances), the case came

on for a one day trial before the Honorable Rodney S. Page. The parties were
unable to complete presentation of the case during the one day trial. Therefore, in
open court on the first day of trial, Judge Page scheduled a second day of trial for
November 7, 2003. (See trial record at page 308.)
8.

On October 24,2003 (between the first and second days of trial),
8

Leslie Blosch retained her new, and third attorney of record, Stephen Spencer
in place of her previous, and second attorney of record, Denise Larkin. (See trial
record at page 316.)
9.

On November 7, 2003, the case came on for the second day of trial

before the Honorable Rodney S. Page. After the conclusion of the presentation of
evidence and the conclusion of argument, Judge Page took the case under
advisement. Further, Judge Page directed each party to submit an attorney fee
affidavit and a corresponding response. (See trial record at page 342.)
10.

On December 17, 2003, Leslie Blosch substituted herself in as her

own attorney of record in place of her third counsel of record, Stephen Spencer.
11.

On December 19, 2003, the Honorable Rodney S. Page issued a

written and lengthy trial ruling regarding the various issues. This ruling directed
Albert Blosch's counsel to prepare the Findings of Fact and Decree of Divorce.
12.

On February 24, 2004, Judge Page signed the Decree of Divorce and

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. On February 26, 2004, the trial court
entered the Decree of Divorce in to the registry of judgments.
C.

Facts Relevant to Issues Prevented for Review:

1.

On June 12, 1996, Albert Blosch and Leslie Blosch married. On

July 3, 2002, Albert Blosch filed his Verified Petition for Divorce in the Second
Judicial District Court. (See trial record at page 1.)
2.

During the course of the marriage, the parties never had any children.
9

Albert Blosch had one older son from a previous marriage, who occasionally
visited the parties. Leslie Blosch has never had any children from any
relationships. (See trial record at page 1.)
3.

On October 23, 1992 (prior to the marriage), Leslie Blosch obtained

an associates degree from Stevens Henager College, in the Ogden area, that
qualified her to work as a legal secretary. Leslie Blosch worked in this field for a
short period of time, prior to the marriage. (See trial record at page 109.)
4.

During the marriage, Leslie Blosch then worked in a series of jobs.

Leslie Blosch's last job during the course of the marriage was as a full time
receptionist for May's Custom Tile and Granite. She earned $9.00 per hour in that
job. Leslie Blosch voluntarily quit that job, not long before Albert Blosch filed
his Petition for Divorce. (See trial transcript testimony of Albert Blosch on direct
examination, and trial testimony of Leslie Blosch.)
5.

Leslie Blosch is able bodied and capable of employment. Leslie

Blosch only asserted a claim of post traumatic stress disorder, shortly prior to the
trial. (See trial record at page 858, paragraphs 26-30.)
6.

At trial, Albert Blosch's economist witness, John Matthews, M.S.,

from the Utah Department of Workforce Services, testified that Leslie Blosch is
capable of increasing her earnings to the $15.00 hour range, through seeking
employment as a legal secretary (her area of education). (See trial record at page
856, paragraphs 18-20.)
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7.

Leslie Blosch's reasonable monthly financial need, as established by

the trial court, was approximately $2,550.00 per month. (See trial record at page
33.) At an earlier stage of the proceedings, Leslie Blosch provided an answer to
discovery indicating that her reasonable monthly financial need was about
$2,141.25. (See Petitioner's Exhibit Number 2.)
8.

At the time of trial, Albert Blosch earned $7,700.00 per month gross

and $5,500 per month net. Albert Blosch's reasonable monthly financial need, as
assigned by the Court, was $2,716.00. (See trial record at page 855, paragraph
15.)
9.

Leslie Blosch did not make any direct contribution to Albert Blosch's

job skills or education. (See trial record at page 855, paragraph 15.)
10.

Leslie Blosch did not work in a business owned by Albert Blosch.

(See trial record at page 855, paragraph 15.)
11.

During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired a marital

condominium. At trial, the parties stipulated to the value of this marital
condominium at $127,175.00, with a loan balance of $93,946.42, leaving
$33,228.58 in net equity. (See trial record at page 308.)
12.

Albert Blosch had a 401(k) through his employment at Skywest. At

trial, the parties stipulated to the marital value of this 401(k) at $87,425.26. This
401(k) also was encumbered by a loan used to procure the marital condominium in
the amount of $25,079.72. (See trial record at page 308, and Petitioner's exhibits
11

35 through 38.)
13.

At the time of trial, Albert Blosch also had 937.64 shares of Skywest

stock at 17.80 per share. (See trial record at page 854.)
14.

In its ruling, the trial court evenly apportioned the foregoing marital

assets between the parties. (See trial record at page 308.)
15.

Overall, the Court awarded Leslie Blosch $6,500.00 in attorney fees.

(See trial record at page 862.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Ai

The Court should reject Leslie Blosch's appeal in its entirety
because she has failed to marshal any evidence on any of the
points she raises on appeal.

In order to be heard on appeal, Utah law requires an appellant to to marshal
the controlling evidence both against, and in favor, of a party's position. This
standard requires a party to make a detailed, specific, and comprehensive
reference to all favorable and unfavorable controlling facts in the trial court. After
assembling such facts, the appellant must then point to a fatal flaw in the evidence.
In this case, Leslie Blosch has utterly failed to marshal the evidence. First, Leslie
Blosch has failed to support her point of view with facts from the trial court
record. Instead, Leslie Blosch simply presents an argument to advocate her point
of view. On this basis, this Court should reject Leslie Blosch's appeal, in its
entirety.
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B.

This Court should further reject Leslie Blosch's appeal in its
entirety because Leslie Blosch has failed to properly brief any
of the issues.

Under Utah law, an appellant has a duty to properly brief her issues on
appeal, by citing a detailed analysis of cases, and by applying those cases to the
relevant facts. In this case, in her brief, Leslie Blosch has failed to make any
detailed legal or factual arguments in support of her position. Instead, Leslie
Blosch simply string cites cases, without making any detailed legal or factual
supporting argument. On this additional basis, this Court should reject Leslie
Blosch's appeal in its entirety.
C.

This Court should affirm the trial court's ruling on alimony,
because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in calculating
the alimony award.

Utah law requires this Court to uphold a trial court's alimony award, unless
it finds that the trial court abused its discretion in arriving at the award. Further, a
trial court does not abuse its discretion, so long as the trial court makes a proper
factual finding on each required alimony element, and each finding is supported
by evidence in the record. Further, Utah law specifically allows a trial court to
enter an alimony award that is less than the length of the marriage.
In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in arriving at the
alimony award. Instead, the trial court made proper factual findings on each
required alimony element, in regard to its alimony award. In addition, the
13

detailed evidence in the trial court record amply and strongly supports the trial
court's alimony ruling. Further, the trial court properly assessed the length of
alimony.
D.

This Court should affirm the trial court's marital property
distribution, because the Court did not abuse its discretion and evenly
distributed marital property between the parties.

Utah law requires this Court to uphold a trial court's property distribution,
unless it finds that the trial court abused its discretion. Under this standard, this
Court should not overturn a trial court's property distribution, if it distributed
marital property in an approximately equal and just manner.
In this case, the trial court did not in any way abuse its discretion in
apportioning marital property. At the outset of trial, the parties properly stipulated
to the value of the major marital assets including the marital home, Albert
Blosch's 401(k), and even vehicle values. The trial court then distributed the
marital property in an equitable manner. Accordingly, Leslie Blosch's claims to
the contrary are simply inappropriate and unfounded.
JL

This Court should affirm the court's attorney fee award, because the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in calculating the award.

Under Utah law, a trial court has broad discretion in whether to award
attorney fees to a party, and in what amount. Under this standard, a trial court is
free to award less then a party's claimed award, so long as the trial court makes
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adequate findings. In this case, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in
the amount of attorney fees it awarded to Leslie Blosch.
F.

This Court should award Albert Blosch all of his reasonable fees and
costs on this appeal because Leslie Blosch brought this appeal in a
frivolous manner. Further, the Court should deny any award of fees
to Leslie Blosch.

Utah law provides that this Court can award a responding party
attorney fees in responding to a frivolous appeal. In this case, this Court should
award Albert Blosch his costs and attorney fees because Leslie Blosch has brought
this appeal in a frivolous manner by making unsupported statements, by seeking
unjustified legal relief, by failing to marshal the evidence, by failing to brief the
issues, and by unnecessarily prolonging this appeal through
multiple requests for extension.
In contrast, this Court should specifically deny an award of
attorney fees to Leslie Blosch in connection with this appeal. Specifically, the
Court should not make any additional award of attorney fees to Leslie
Blosch, because it should not designate her as the prevailing party in this action
on any of the issues.
G.

The Court should decline to hear the remaining issues raised by
Leslie Blosch, because they are not real issues for appeal and Leslie
Blosch did not preserve these issues for appeal.

This Court should disregard the remaining issues which Leslie
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Blosch seeks to raise in her appeal, because they are simply not valid issues to
this appeal. First, Leslie Blosch tries to claim that she did not receive adequate
discovery responses at the trial court level. In actual fact, Albert Blosch provided
Leslie Blosch with ample and voluminous discovery. Further, Leslie Blosch did
not preserve this issue for appeal, by filing a motion to compel at the trial
court level, despite having had abundant and adequate time to undertake such
action, if she thought this was necessary. Further, the tax issue and other
referenced issues are not real issue to this appeal.
ARGUMENT
A.

The Utah Court of Appeals should reject Leslie Blosch's appeal in its
entirety because Leslie Blosch has failed to marshal the evidence.

It is a pre-requisite for an appellant to marshal evidence, in order for this
Court to even consider an issue that the appellant presents to the Court for
consideration. The Utah Supreme Court described an appellant's burden to
marshal evidence as follows: "To prevail [a party] must first marshal all the
evidence that supports the [trial] court's findings and then demonstrate that the
evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the court's ruling is
insufficient." State ex rel W.A.. 63 P.3d 607, 620 (Utah 2002).
In order to properly marshal, an appellant must do three specific things.
First, the appellant must specifically outline both the negative and positive
salient facts related to an issue on appeal. Second, an appellant must make a
16

detailed and specific reference to the trial record to support every one of these
salient facts. Third, the appellant must then point to a fatal flaw in the evidence,
that undermines the trial court ruling.
The Utah Supreme Court described these specific requirements, as follows:
"A mere reference to where evidence supporting the verdict can be located . . .
does not constitute marshaling. Rather, marshaling requires that the party
challenging the finding show us where the evidence can be located and list the
specific evidence supporting the verdict... If the rule were otherwise, the
marshaling requirement could easily be circumvented. Indeed, a party could
satisfy its marshaling obligation by simply placing the record in our hands and
declaring that all of the evidence supporting the verdict could be found therein."
Id at 620.
In her brief, Leslie Blosch has failed to satisfy any of the marshaling
requirements. First, Leslie Blosch has failed to outline any of the salient facts in
her brief. Further, Leslie Blosch has failed to adequately cite to the trial court
record. Further, Leslie Blosch has failed to reference any of the key meaningful
findings or facts. On this basis, this Court should reject Leslie Blosch's entire
appeal.
IL

This Court should reject Leslie Blosch's appeal in its entirety
because Leslie Blosch has failed to adequately brief the issues.

Under Utah law, this Court does not need to consider issues in an
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appellant's appeal, that the appellant does not properly brief. The Utah Supreme
Court described this as follows: "It is well established that a reviewing court will
not address arguments that are not adequately briefed. In deciding whether an
argument has been adequately briefed we look to the standard set forth in rule
24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This rule states that the
argument in the appellant's brief 'shall contain the contentions and reasons of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented . . . with citations to the authorities,
statutes and parts of the record relied on.' Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires not
just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned
analysis based on that authority. We have previously stated that this court is not a
depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and
research." State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998) quoting State v.
Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988).
In this case, Leslie Blosch has failed to satisfy her burden to adequately
brief the issues. She has failed to provide detailed and reasoned legal analysis on
any of the issues. Instead, she has simply string cited a number of cases, without
demonstrating why these cases would justify the relief that she seeks. Moreover,
she has failed to apply the facts to the law. Accordingly, it appears that Leslie
Blosch has dumped her burden of argument and research on to this Court. On this
basis, this Court should reject Leslie Blosch's appeal in its entirety.

18

(Q.

This Court should affirm the trial court's alimony
ruling, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in arriving
at this alimony award, and the trial court properly considered all
relevant alimony factors.

It is a well established principal of law that this Court should affirm a trial
court's alimony ruling, unless the trial court abused its discretion in calculating the
alimony award. For example, this Court has stated: "Trial courts have broad
discretion in making alimony awards. Therefore, we will not disturb a trial court's
alimony award so long as the trial court exercised its discretion within the
appropriate legal standards . . . and supported its decision with adequate findings
and conclusions . . . " Childs v. Childs. 967 P.2d 942, 946 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
In exercising its discretion, the specific factors that a trial court should
examine are: 1) The financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 2) the
recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 3) the ability of the
payor spouse to provide support; 4) the length of the marriage; 5) whether the
recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 6) whether the
recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and
6) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor
spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing
the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. Utah Code Ann. § 30-35(8)(a).
19

In the instant case, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in
calculating the alimony award, by making findings under each required alimony
element, as follows:
1.

The trial court made proper findings on Leslie Blosch's financial
condition and need.

The trial court made a specific finding regarding Leslie Blosch's financial
condition, and need for alimony. Specifically, the trial court found that Leslie
Blosch had a reasonable monthly financial need of $2,550.00. (See trial record at
page 859.) Further, the trial court's finding of Leslie Blosch's financial need was
supported by the record. The court arrived at its calculation of Leslie Blosch's
financial need by examining the financial declaration submitted at trial by Leslie
Blosch and by comparing an earlier sheet of expenses that Leslie Blosch submitted
to the Court that indicated her monthly expenses were $2,141.25. (See
Petitioner's Exhibit 2 and Respondent's Exhibit 35.) Further, Albert Blosch
provided credible testimony that demonstrated that the monthly budget of
$2,550.00 for Leslie Blosch was a high award in light of the parties' standard of
living. For example, Albert Blosch testified that he helped Leslie Blosch get
debt free, that the parties lived a modest lifestyle in a modest condominium, and
rarely went on vacations or incurred exorbitant expenses. (See Albert Blosch
testimony on direct, as contained in trial transcript.) Therefore, the Judge's
finding in regard to Leslie Blosch's financial condition and need, was amply
20

supported by the record.
2i

The trial court made proper findings on Leslie Blosch's ability to
produce income.

In addition, the trial court made a proper finding in regard to Leslie
Blosch's ability to produce income. In its findings, the trial court imputed an
income of $9.00 per hour to Leslie Blosch, and indicated that she was
immediately capable of earning this amount through immediate re-entry in to the
job market. Further, the trial court further found that Leslie Blosch was a trained
legal secretary. Impliedly, the trial court found that Leslie Blosch was capable of
increasing her earnings to $15.00 per hour as a legal secretary. (See trial record
at 395.)
The trial record amply and abundantly supported the trial court's finding
regarding Leslie Blosch's ability to immediately commence work at $9.00 per
hour, and to increase to the $15.00 per hour range, over a reasonable time
period.

At trial, Leslie Blosch tried to argue that she had post traumatic stress

disorder, and that this condition somehow affected her ability to work. (See
Respondent's Exhibit 56 and 57.) Nevertheless, one of Leslie Blosch's two
witnesses on this issue, Dr. Victor Cline, testified that Leslie Blosch was
immediately capable of full time work. (See trial transcript of Victor Cline
testimony.) In addition, Dr. Carol Gage (Albert Blosch's psychologist witness on
this issue who had examined Leslie Blosch prior to trial) further testified that
21

Leslie Blosch was fully capable of immediate full time employment. (See trial
transcript of Dr. Carol Gage testimony.) Moreover, John Matthews, (Albert
Blosch's economist witness) testified that Leslie Blosch was capable at her skill
level of making $7.90 to $10.90 per hour as a receptionist in the Salt Lake region.
Further, John Matthews testified that, by working in her trained field as a legal
secretary, Leslie Blosch could start at $12.00 per hour, and could increase her
hourly wage to $15.00 per hour, after a reasonable period of training. (See trial
transcript of John Matthews testimony.) Thus, the trial court properly exercised
its independent discretion in imputing a $9.00 per hour wage to Leslie Blosch.
2*

The trial court made proper findings on Albert Blosch's ability to
pay.

In addition, the trial court made a proper finding regarding Albert Blosch's
ability to pay Leslie Blosch alimony. Specifically, the trial court found that Albert
Blosch received a gross salary in his employment with Skywest Airlines at the
time of trial of $7,700.00 per month. The trial court also found that Albert Blosch
earned a net income of approximately $5,500.00 per month at the time of trial
Further, the Court found that Albert Blosch had reasonable monthly expenses of
$2,716.00 per month. (See trial record at page 308.)
The trial court's findings regarding Albert Blosch's ability to pay alimony
was well supported by the trial evidence. At trial, Albert Blosch provided his
current financial information, including his recent pay check stubs and tax returns
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as Petitioner's exhibits. Further, Albert Blosch provided a financial declaration to
the Court, that described his expenses in detail. (See Petitioner's exhibits 3
through 20, and Respondent's exhibit 40.) Finally, Albert Blosch testified on
the record in great detail regarding his income, debts, and financial situation. (See
trial transcript of Albert Blosch testimony.) Based on this information, the Court
properly assessed Albert Blosch's ability to pay Leslie Blosch alimony.
4

The trial court made a proper finding on the length of the marriage.

Next, the Court made a proper finding regarding the length of the marriage.
The Court properly found that the parties were married on June 12, 1996. Indeed,
both parties agreed in their initial pleadings that they were married on this date.
(See trial record page 2.) Further, Albert Blosch testified, without dispute, that
the parties were married on such date. (See trial transcript of Albert Blosch
testimony.)
5.

The trial court made a proper finding on the lack of children.

In addition, the trial court made a proper finding that the parties did not
have any children and that none were expected. At trial, both parties testified that
they did not have any joint children, and that none were expected. At trial,
Albert Blosch testified that it was Leslie Blosch who primarily instigated the
decision not to have children. (See trial transcript of Albert Blosch testimony.) At
trial, Leslie Blosch did not substantially dispute this testimony. (See trial
transcript of Leslie Blosch testimony.) Further, Albert Blosch testified without
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substantial dispute that Leslie Blosch had abundant free time on her hands,
without significant care obligations to any other persons, and with the ready
ability to enter the workforce. (See trial transcript of Albert Blosch testimony.)
£.

The trial court made a proper finding that Leslie Blosch did not
directly contribute to Albert Blosch's education or work related
training. It was also clear that Leslie Blosch did not work in any
business owned by Albert Blosch.

The trial court further made a specific finding that Leslie Blosch did not
make any direct contribution toward Albert Blosch's earning potential by allowing
him to attend school, or for paying for any of his training. (See trial record page
2.) Further, the trial record clearly supported this finding. First, Albert Blosch
testified that he was already a trained pilot working for Skywest airlines, at the
time he met Leslie Blosch. Albert Blosch then testified in great detail that Leslie
Blosch did not in any way pay for any of his employment training, in any fashion.
Further, the trial record was also clear that Leslie Blosch never worked in any
business owned by Albert Blosch. (See trial transcript of Albert Blosch
testimony.)
7.

The Court properly established a three year alimony period.

Under Utah law, a trial Court clearly has the authority to fashion an alimony
award that is less than the length of the marriage. For example, in Childs v. Childs.
this Court specifically observed "The appellant argues that she should have been
awarded alimony for a period equivalent to the length of the marriage under Utah
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Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1998). We have reviewed section 30-3-35 and find
nothing to support the argument that the trial court is required to award alimony
for a period equivalent to the length of the marriage. Therefore, we affirm the trial
court's alimony award." 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Arguably, the instant case presents an even stronger justification for a short
term alimony award than the Childs case. As in Childs, Albert and Leslie Blosch
were married for a relatively short time period. (See trial record at page 1.)
However, unlike the Childs case, Albert and Leslie Blosch did not have any
children together. (See trial record at page 1.) Based on this and all of the other
combined factors, the trial court's three year alimony award was appropriate in
this case.
D.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in apportioning marital
property between the parties. Instead the trial court equitably and
evenly apportioned marital property between the parties. Indeed, the
trial court's property apportionment was favorable to Leslie Blosch in
several respects.

A trial court has broad discretion in apportioning marital property between
parties in a domestic case. This Court has articulated this principle as follows:
"The trial court in a divorce action has considerable discretion in equitably
adjusting the financial and property interests of the parties. Because the court's
distribution of property is endowed with a presumption of validity, we will not
disturb it on appeal unless it is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of discretion.
Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
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In the instant case, the trial court made an equitable apportionment of the
parties' marital property, as follows:
1.

The Court properly valued and apportioned Albert Blosch's 40 l(k).

It is clear that the Court properly valued Albert Blosch's 401(k) with
his employer Skywest and properly divided the 401(k). At the outset of trial, the
parties stipulated to the marital value of the 401(k) at the time of trial to be
$87,425.56. A simply mathematical calculation on the exhibits showed that
$87,425.56 was the marital value of the 401(k) ($103,750.86 value of the 401(k)
at the time of trial, less Albert Blosch's pre-marital contribution of $16, 325.60,
equals $87,425.26). (See Petitioner's exhibits 35 through 38.) In addition, the
trial Court awarded Leslie Blosch precisely one half of the marital value in the
401(k), as of the first day of trial. (See trial record at page 395.)
In addition, the Court found that Albert Blosch had acquired some Skywest
stock. Again, the Court awarded Leslie Blosch precisely half of the amount of the
stock. (See trial record at page 395.)
2.

The trial court properly apportioned the real property between the
parties.

Further, it is clear that the trial court properly apportioned the real property
between the parties. At the outset of trial, the parties stipulated that there was
equity in the marital property in the amount of $33,228.58. (See trial record at
page 308.) In its ruling, the Court then apportioned the $25,079.72 Skywest
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401(k) loan which was used to procure the house toward the house, leaving a net
equity in the home of $8,148.86. Again, the Court apportioned this equity equally
between the parties through its method of division of assets. (See trial record at
page 395.)
3.

The trial court properly apportioned personal property between the
parties.

Leslie Blosch has no valid claim that the trial court failed to properly
apportion personal property between the parties. In actual fact, the trial court
applied great detail and precision in apportioning the personal property between
the parties. (See trial record at page 395.) At the outset of trial, the parties
stipulated as to the value of the respective parties' vehicles. (See trial record at
page 308.) Further, at trial, Albert Blosch's witness, appraiser Jerry Erkelens
provided detailed testimony on the value of the parties' remaining personal
property items. ( See trial transcript in regard to Jerry Erkelens.) The trial court
did not accept Jerry Erkelens' testimony on face value. Instead, the trial court
made certain adjustments in favor of Leslie Blosch based on rebuttal testimony.
The trial court then equitably apportioned the personal property value between the
parties and paid attention to the redistribution of certain small items. (See trial
record at page 395.)

Based upon the foregoing, the trial court fairly and

equitably apportioned the marital property between the parties in all respects.
E.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the amount of attorney
fees it ordered Albert Blosch to pay over to Leslie Blosch.
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Under Utah law, a trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to
award a party attorney fees, and what the amount of the award should be. For
example this Court has stated "[A] trial court may award attorney fees
in divorce and custody proceedings. The decision to award attorney fees rests
primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court. However the trial court must
base the award on evidence of the receiving spouse's financial need, the payor's
spouse's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees. Childs v.
Childs. 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Under this standard, a trial court has discretion to award a requesting party
less than the amount that party has actually incurred in attorney fees. For
example, in Rasband v. Rasband. the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court in awarding a wife only half her requested attorney because the case was not
particularly difficult from a legal, factual or discovery standpoint. 752 P.2d 1331,
1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
In addition, it is the requesting party that has the burden of presenting
evidence to the trial court regarding the reasonableness of the requested fees. For
example, in Sorensen v. Sorensen. this Court stated that: "In order to recover
attorney fees in a divorce action, the moving party must set forth evidence, 1)
demonstrating that the award is reasonable; and 2) establishing thefinancialneed
of the requesting party compels the award. 769 P.2d 820, 832 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
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In this case, the trial court considered all of the requisite factors in arriving
at its combined $6,500.00 attorney fee award to Leslie Blosch.
1.

The trial Court did make a finding regarding Leslie Blosch's need
for attorney fees.

Specifically, the trial court made the requisite finding that Leslie Blosch
did not have the ability to pay her attorney fees without invading the substantial
assets the court awarded to her at trial. (See trial record at page 395.)
2.

The trial court made a finding regarding Albert Blosch's ability to
pay the attorney fees.

The trial court also made the necessary finding regarding Albert Blosch's
ability to pay Leslie Blosch's attorney fees. Specifically, the trial court found that
Albert Blosch had some ability to assist Leslie Blosch in th payment of her fees.
(See trial record at page 395.)
3.

The trial court also made specific findings regarding reasonableness.

Further, the trial court made a specific finding that the level of fees claimed
by Leslie Blosch was unreasonable in relation to the case. Specifically, the trial
court found that Leslie Blosch unnecessarily interjected herself into the
proceeding, changed attorneys multiple times, and took action to drive up the cost
of the proceeding for both parties. On this basis, the court specifically found that
the combined level of attorney fees expended by Leslie Blosch's three attorneys
was not necessary or reasonable. Moreover, the trial court specifically found that
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the case was not complex in terms of legal issues, factual issues, or discovery.
Therefore, the trial court awarded Leslie Blosch an additional $4,000.00 in
attorney fees beyond the $2,500.00 she had already received from Albert Blosch.
(See trial record at page 395.) Further, the trial court based its ruling on detailed
attorney fee affidavits submitted by both sides. (See trial record at page 348, 350,
and 353.)
4.

Leslie Blosch has failed to satisfy her burden that the attorney fee
award is unreasonable.

Moreover, Leslie Blosch has failed to provide any adequate explanation to
indicate why this generous award of $6,500.00 in attorney fees was not
reasonable, in light of a divorce case of this type. Further, it
should be noted that Leslie Blosch has ample ability to pay her own attorney fees,
through the marital property apportionment that the Court awarded over to her.
F.

This Court should award Albert Blosch his reasonable costs and
attorney fees incurred on this appeal as against Leslie Blosch.
Further, this Court should specifically decline to award Leslie Blosch
any attorney fees in connection with this appeal.

1. The Court should award Albert Blosch his attorney fees on appeal.
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure authorize this Court to award
attorney fees against an appellant when the appellant brings a frivolous appeal.
See Utah Rule App. Proc. 33(a) and (b) (2004). Indeed, In Eames v. Eames. the
Court imposed attorney fees under this provision against a man that appealed
similar issues to the case at bar. 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In
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arriving at the attorney fee award, the Court set forth a three part test on whether
this Court should award attorney fees in a case such as this. Specifically, the
Court held that a court may impose attorney fees if: (1) The appellant lacks an
honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (2) The appellant
intends to take unconscionable advantage of the other party; and 3) The appellant
has an intent to hinder, delay or defraud others. Id. at 397.
In this appeal, it appears that Leslie Blosch's activities satisfy each of these
three prongs. First, Leslie Blosch makes repeated statements in her brief, that
she should know are simply not true. Leslie Blosch's inaccurate statements
include her statement that she was awarded only 5% of the marital assets, her
statement that the 401(k) was not properly apportioned despite the on the record
stipulation at trial, and her series of false and personal accusations regarding
Albert Blosch's character and demeanor.
Further, Leslie Blosch has simply failed to support her arguments by
setting forth any supporting case law, that would justify the relief she is seeking.
Further, Leslie Blosch is seeking an exorbitant and unreasonable amount of both
alimony, and attorney fees, through this appeal.
Finally, Leslie Blosch has filed multiple motions to continue this appeal.
It appears that Leslie Blosch has possibly filed these motions for her own gain
and benefit to allow herself extended time to work on this appeal, to the
disadvantage of Albert Blosch. Based on these combined reasons, this Court
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should assess attorney fees against Leslie Blosch.
2.

This Court should decline to award Leslie Blosch any attorney fees
on appeal.

In order to ordinarily recover attorney fees on appeal under Utah law, an
appellant must have typically received attorney fees at trial, and must also
then prevail on the main issues on appeal. See Childs. v. Childs. 967 P.2d 942,
947 (Utah Q. App. 1998).
In this case, Albert Blosch believes that Leslie Blosch is not entitled to
prevail on any of the issues set forth in this appeal. Therefore, Albert Blosch
believes that the Court should specifically decline to award any attorney fees to
Leslie Blosch in connection with this appeal.
G.

Leslie Blosch's remaining referenced issues on appeal are not valid
appeal issues. Therefore, the Court should decline to rule on these
issues.

In her brief, Leslie Blosch has raised a number of other issues by reference.
First, Leslie Blosch claims that she did not somehow receive discovery.

In

actual fact, Albert Blosch provided Leslie Blosch with voluminous and ample
discovery. (See trial Court record at page 464, and 487). Moreover, Leslie
Blosch did not preserve this issue by filing any motion to compel in the trial court.
In addition, Leslie Blosch somehow claims that taxes are an issue. This simply is
not a valid issue in light of the fact that it is customary for parties to file separate
tax returns after divorce, and the trial court actually ordered Albert Blosch to hold
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Leslie Blosch harmless for any tax consequences of his real estate dealings in
regard to past years in which the partiesfiledjoint returns. (See trial record at
page 915.) On this basis, the Court should decline to address any further issues
raised by Leslie Blosch in her brief.
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering any provisions of the
its final ruling, that is on appeal to this Court. Therefore, this Court should
affirm the trial court's final ruling, in every respect. Further, this Court should
award Albert Blosch his attorney fees and costs in responding to this appeal, as
against Leslie Blosch.
Respectfully submitted this ^-~ day of February, 2005.

CRIST, CATHCART & PETERSON, L.L.C.

DOUGfyAS D. ADAIR
Attorney for Albert Blosch
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this XX- day of February, 2005, I caused to be
mailedfirstclass postage prepaid two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF
OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE to:
Leslie Blosch
Defendant/Appellant
953 Shetland Lane
Farmington, Utah 84025
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF U T > T H D I ^ I C T COURT
COUNTY OF DAVIS, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT
ALBERT B. BLOSCH
Plaintiff,

RULING

Case No. 024701139
LESLIE DAWN ETHINGTON BLOSCH
Defendant
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Judge: Rodney S. Page
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This matter came on for trial on September 29, 2003, and November 7, 2003.
The petitioner was represented by his attorney, Douglas D. Adair. The respondent was
represented on the first day of trial by her attorney Denise P. Larkin; and on the second
day of trial, by her new attorney, Stephen D. Spencer.
After the first day of trial, the Court granted a Decree of Divorce to the parties, to
become final upon entry. Plaintiff was ordered to temporarily continue the respondent
on his health insurance, under COBRA and pay the costs thereof. The prior order of
the Court was continued on a temporary basis, and all other issues were reserved for
further hearing.
The Court having now heard all of the evidence, and the arguments of counsel,
and being fully advised in the premises, rules as follows:
The parties were married on the 12th day of June, 1996. No children have been
born as issue of the marriage and none are expected.
Shortly after the marriage, the parties moved to San Diego, California to provide
the respondent with a change of environment. They returned to Utah a short time later,
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and lived with petitioner's parents. In November, 1999, they purchased a two-bedroom
condo in North Salt Lake. They rented the condo and continued to live with petitioner's
parents. At some point, they moved into the condo and respondent continues to reside
there under a temporary Court order.
Because of respondent's financial condition, the condo was purchased in
petitioner's name alone. They financed the condo with a first mortgage to Countrywide
Mortgage and borrowed $29,000 from petitioner's 401K through his employment. The
loans are in petitioner's name, alone. There is a balance on the first mortgage of
$93,946, and on the 401K loan of $25,079. The parties stipulated that the condo has a
current market value of $127,175, leaving a net equity of approximately $8,150.
During the course of the marriage up to the time of trial, petitioner accumulated
approximately $87,425 in his 401K retirement plan with SkyWest. He also acquired
approximately 937.64 shares of SkyWest stock valued at $17.80 per share. The parties
also acquired various other accounts at Smith Barney and Zions Security.
On March 20, 2002, petitioner withdrew from the Smith Barney Account
approximately $2,821 and on March 21, 2002 from the Zions investment account,
approximately $4,934.66. On March 15, 2002, he also withdrew from a Zions
investment account, the sum of $9,486.
When the parties married, the petitioner was essentially debt-free. The
respondent had considerable debt, and a number of her debts had gone to collection.
Included among her premarital debts, was an RC Willey bill of $3,435; higher education
(student loan) $3 514 and CTI (student loan) $5,687. Both of the student loans h a d ^ v ^ v * *
gone to collection. The total of these three debts was approximately $12,636. #<sy'
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At some point, the parties decided to borrow money from petitioner's father to
pay off their debts. They borrowed $26,000 from petitioner's father and paid off
respondent's premarital debts of some $12,636 and other consumer debt that the
parties had acquired during the course of the marriage. The respondent agreed, when
they borrowed the money, that she would continue to work outside of the home until the
debt was paid. They made regular monthly payments on the loan and at the time this
matter was filed, there was a balance owing in excess of $9,000.
Each of the parties have various items of furniture and fixture and personal items
in their possession. These items were appraised by Mr. John Erkelens, Jr., a
professional appraiser. He placed a value on the items in petitioner's possession at
$2,595 and those in respondent's possession at $6,551.
From the testimony, it appeared that the sofa and love seat and hide-a-bed in
petitioner's possession were premarital property and that the computer in petitioner's
possession, which Mr. Erkelens did not personally inspect, was undervalued by about
$500. With these adjustments, the value of those items in petitioner's possession was
approximately $2,435.
With respect to the items in respondent's possession, it appeared that the sofa
and love seat were overvalued by about $600, that the bedroom set by about $1,500,
and that the seventeen-inch T.V. was a premarital asset. With these adjustments, the
value of the items in respondent's possession was approximately $4,451.
Petitioner has a 1997 Grand Cherokee with a balance owing of approximately
$5,290. It has an equity of approximately $1,850. Respondent has a 1996 Chevrolet^
Beretta, that is free-and-clear and valued at approximately $2,675.
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Petitioner is presently employed as a pilot with SkyWest Airlines, and was so
employed when the parties married. He has had no additional schooling or training
during the course of the marriage, for which the parties have had to pay. He currently
receives a gross salary of approximately $7,700 per month, and net after taxes, health
insurance, FICA, Medicare and loan payment, of approximately $5,500 per month.
The respondent was working full-time in a nightclub when the parties met and
were married in 1996. She had worked steadily up until that time. The respondent also
received an Associate Degree in legal secretary training from Stevens-Henager College
in 1992. She tried working in that profession, but was let go after a short time.
Following the parties marriage, respondent continued to work full-time, primarily as a
receptionist for various businesses. She was an excellent employee and received
several letters of recommendation from her employers. She never experienced any
health or psychological problems which interfered with her employment.
In the Spring of 2001, she quit her employment and indicated to petitioner that
she didn't want to work any longer, even though they still owed a substantial amount to
petitioner's father on the loan they had obtained to pay off their debts.
A person working as a legal secretary in our area could expect to make an entrylevel wage of approximately $12.00 per hour with an average, after a period of training,
of $15.00 per hour.
A person working as a receptionist in the area, can expect an entry-level wage of
$7.90, but with experience, can expect an average wage of $8.60 and $10.90 per hour.
The training period for such employment would be relatively short.
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During the marriage and up until just before trial, the respondent had never
sought any additional training or education, nor had she indicated any desire to do so.
The issue of further education or training is a matter of recent origin, and even up until
the time of trial, respondent had taken no formal steps to pursue any goals in that area.
There was no evidence of any prior health or psychological problems that interfered
with respondent's ability to work. That issue only arose after this matter was filed and
just prior to the first trial date. No mention was made of the problem in any affidavits
filed in this matter, nor in the deposition taken in February of 2003.
During the marriage, the parties lived primarily in apartments in Midvale and the
Bountiful area. They have always resided in a relatively modest neighborhood. The
condo they eventually purchased and resided in is in a similar neighborhood. It is a
modest two-bedroom condo in North Salt Lake with 1300 square feet of living space.
The parties also had a very modest lifestyle with no history of extravagant expenses or
any particular vacation pattern.
At an order to show cause hearing in September, 2002, in conjunction with this
case, the respondent filed an affidavit through her attorney claiming that her living
expenses were $2,140 per month. That included the condo payment and a car
payment of $195. The car is now paid for. However, that expense statement did not
include the sum of $208 per month which would be required to continue her medical
insurance coverage under COBRA.
During the course of the marriage, petitioner had an arrangement with his
brother, who is a building contractor, whsreby he, because of his better credit rating^e*^
would co-sign, or in some cases sign in his own name on construction loans
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brother. As part of the agreement, the petitioner would then be allowed to claim the
interest on the construction loan for income tax purposes. That sometime required title
to the property covered by the loan being in his name, either alone or with his brother
as a co-owner. At one time, this also involved an L.L.C. organized by his brother.
in these instances, the petitioner was not involved in the actual construction or
any related matters. The only benefit received, was the tax benefit in which both of the
parties participated.
After this complaint was filed, petitioner withdrew $2,821 from his Smith Barney
account and $4,934 from his Zions investment account and paid that money along with
some money from an income tax return to his father to pay off the balance of $9,000plus dollars which the parties owed the petitioner's father on the consolidation loan.
About this same time, petitioner withdrew approximately $9,400 from his Zions
investment account for which he cannot specifically account, except that it went to pay
family obligations and ongoing expenses.
During the course of the marriage, respondent had no particular health or
emotional problems, however, after the complaint was filed and following a deposition
taken in February of 2003, respondent raised for the first time the question of her
emotional health and the claim that she suffered from a Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder, therefore could not work. In that regard, she had her first visit with Dr. Cline in
February of 2003.
All of the experts agreed, that based upon the self-reported symptoms of
respondent, supported by certain psychological testinq, that she does manifest t h s ^ ^ ^ w ,
symptoms of PTSD, but were unable to indicate the cause.

It was speculated that the source of the symptoms could be a delayed reaction
to a prior difficult marriage of the respondent; her memory of a prior lifestyle coming into
conflict with her present, changed value system; a conflicted relationship between the
parties; or the stress of the present divorce litigation, or a combination of all of these
factors.
It was evident from the file and the trial, that respondent had been actively
engaged in every aspect of the divorce litigation, to the extent that there had been
disagreements between herself and her counsel. This has resulted in her changing
counsel on three different occasions, the last time, between the first and second day of
the trial in this matter. The experts were unable to indicate how long her symptoms
would last, however, both Dr. Cline and Dr. Carol Gage indicated that it would be good
for respondent to get out and become involved in the workforce in some low stress type
of job similar to that of a receptionist.
At trial, the respondent exhibited appropriate demeanor. She appeared very
articulate and knowledgeable, and expressed herself very well. She did not seem to be
intimidated in any way by the trial setting.
The Court found the testimony of Dr. Peterson, a Family Practitioner, to be less
than credible and objective on the psychological issues because of his lack of formal
training in the area, and because of the advocacy stance taken by him in respondent's
favor.
The petitioner testified that he had living expenses of approximately $2,458 per
month, and that appeared reasonable, except for a claim of $200 per month tjc^v^ t 5^ ^ ^
failure to include expense for his car payment of $207 and for utilities, in t\j^rfen§f)aL^
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he did not reside in the condo. The Court finds that utility expenses would reasonably
be about $200 per month, and that $50 per month would be sufficient for travel
expenses. The Court finds that reasonable expenses for the petitioner would be
approximately $2,716 including the utility expense, his car payment, and reduced travel
of $50 per month.
Respondent testified that she had living expenses of $5,026 per month. The
Court finds that those expenses are unreasonable, especially in light of her affidavit
claiming expenses of only $2,141 in September, 2002.
The Court finds that respondent would have reasonable expenses of a house
payment of $898, taxes of $72, condo fee of $40, maintenance fee of $25, real property
insurance of $12, food and household expenses of $260, utilities of $125, phone of
$55, cell phone of $40, personal care $100, medical including COBRA of $208, and copays for medical and dental in the amount of $200, entertainment $50, gifts $25, auto
expenses $150, installment loans $250, for reasonable expenses of approximately
$2,550 per month.
The Court finds that her claim for additional expenses are both excessive and
speculative.
The Court further finds that respondent's claim for damages to the condominium
in the approximate sum of $1,400, although some of which were claimed to have been
caused by petitioner, are primarily maintenance issues.
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court concludes as follows:
That the Decree of Divorce previously granted in this matter should be amends*^
to provide that the decree is granted based upon irreconcilable differences. ^ <o>^
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That the sum which accrued in petitioner's 401K at SkyWest should be valued as
to those sums which accrued during the course of the marriage up to the date of the
trial of September 29, 2003, and each of the parties should be awarded one-half
thereof.
Each of the parties should be awarded one-half of the SkyWest stock, valued on
the same date.
The Court concludes that the sums of $2,821 and $4,934 withdrawn by the
petitioner were used to pay off the balance owing by the parties to petitioner's father,
and therefore, was applied to marital debt.
The sum of $9,400 was withdrawn by the petitioner and used to pay family and
miscellaneous expenses. Although this is a marital asset, in light of the petitioner's
assuming over $12,000 of respondent's premarital debt, the Court will require no
accounting of this sum.
Each of the parties is awarded those vehicles in their possession subject to any
indebtedness thereon. The Court concludes that the equity in each is nearly equal and
therefore makes no adjustment.
Each of the parties is awarded those items of personal property in their
respective possession. The Court concludes that, based upon the findings of the Court,
that the value of those items in respondent's possession, exceeds the value of the
items in petitioner's possession by approximately $1,776. To equalize those sums, the
Court orders that the respondent shall bear the expense of any repairs that need to be
made to the condominium as provided by the estimate.
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The Court awards the condominium to the respondent subject to the first
mortgage in the amount of $93,946. The second mortgage loan on petitioner's 401K is
to be paid off from the marital 401K before it is divided between the parties. That will
leave an equity in the condo of approximately $33,229. One-half of that is awarded to
the petitioner and shall be deducted from respondent's share of the marital 401K.
Within 90 days of the date of this order, respondent is to refinance the condo
and take the petitioner's name off of the loan.
During the 90 day period, the petitioner is to continue to pay the first mortgage
and $1,000 alimony to the respondent. He is also to continue to pay the costs of
COBRA coverage. The condominium payment is considered to be additional alimony.
Respondent is to pay the utilities and condo fee and maintenance and maintain
the premises during this period and allow no damage or waste to occur thereto except
normal wear and tear.
If the respondent is unable to refinance the condo within the 90 days period, then
the condo shall be awarded to the petitioner on the same terms and conditions as set
forth above.
Petitioner is ordered to return to the respondent any CD's which he has that
belong to respondent, and one-half of any CD's that the parties purchased. That order
applies to the respondent also.
The petitioner is to return the T.V. guard to the respondent, if he has it.
The Court concludes that the respondent is able to work in a low stress job such
as a receptionist. And the Court attributes to her an income of approximately $9.00 p§.r
hour for a total of $1,550 per month. The Court concludes that she has
10
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approximately $2,550 per month and that she does not have sufficient income to meet
those needs at this time.
The Court considers that petitioner has reasonable expenses of approximately
$2,716 per month and net income of approximately $5,500 per month, and therefore
has the ability to assist the respondent.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court hereby orders that petitioner pay to the
respondent as alimony the sum of $1,300 per month, provided however, this order shall
not become effective until after the condominium is refinanced or for a period of 90
days, whichever occurs first. After that time, this order shall become effective.
Alimony is to terminate at the end of three years, or by operation of law,
whichever occurs first. For the purposes of calculating the three year period, that
period shall begin to run on October 1, 2003. The Court awards no sums for education
or additional training, the Court concluding that such sums are too speculative and not
supported by the evidence.
Each of the parties are to pay any debt or obligation they have incurred since the
date of separation and hold the other party harmless.
The Court further concludes that each of the parties have incurred attorney's
fees and costs in this matter. Respondent claims attorneys' fees in the approximate
sum of $15,298, which includes $1,430 for her first attorney, $6,523.10 for her second
attorney, and $5,072.50 for her third attorney, who represented ner for 'ess than two
vveeks and during the second day of her trial.
The Court concludes that this case was not overly complex in terms of either^ w ^, ^
discovery or legal issues; further that the fees in this matter tor both petitionen^^>"
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respondent were increased as a result of respondent's decision to employ three
different counsel in the case and by including new issues in the case late in the
proceedings.
The Court concludes that a reasonable attorney's fee, but for the actions of the
respondent, would be $6,500
The Court finds that respondent is without sufficient funds to pay those fees
without invading the assets awarded to her. That in light of petitioner's superior earning
capacity, he has the ability to contribute toward respondent's attorneys' fees. The Court
recognizes that petitioner has already paid $2,500 toward respondent's attorneys' fees
and that he has been required to incur additional fees as a result of the actions of the
respondent in this matter, and therefore orders that petitioner only pay an additional
sum of $4,000 toward respondent's attorneys' fees.
Each of the parties are to bear their own costs.
Plaintiffs counsel is directed to prepare findings and decree in accordance with
the Court's ruling, and submit the same to opposing counsel at least five days prior to
the time that they are submitted to the Court for signature.

Dated this

Iffi*

day of December, AD 2003
BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ruling to:
Douglas D. Adair
845 South Main, Suite 23
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Stephen D. Spencer
47 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Leslie Ethington Blosch
402 North 75 East
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054
postage prepaid this
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- day of December, AD 2003.

Alyson Brown
Clerk of Court

By
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Deputy Court Clerk
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DAVIS COUNTY, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT

ALBERT B. BLOSCH,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner.
v.
Civil Number 024701139DA
LESLIE DAWN ETHINGTON-BLOSCH,
Judge Rodney S. Page
Respondent.
Commissioner David S. Dillon
On September 29, 2003 and November 7, 2003, this case came on for trial before the
Honorable Rodney S. Page. Petitioner appeared personally on both days of trial together with his
attorney of record, Douglas D. Adair. Respondent appeared personally on the first day of trial with
her attorney of record Denise P. Larkin, and on the second day of trial with her subsequent attorney
of record Stephen D. Spencer. During these two days of trial, the Court had the opportunity to hear
evidence from both Petitioner's and Respondent's witnesses, to consider the admitted exhibits, and
to hear arguments of counsel. Being fully advised in the premises, the Court
following:
; and Conclusions of Law
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner and Respondent are both bona fide residents of Davis County, State of

Utah, and have been so for more than three months immediately prior to the filing of this action.
2.

Petitioner and Respondent were married on June 12, 1996.

3.

During the course of the marriage, the parties experienced difficulties, that cannot

be reconciled, which have prevented the parties from pursuing a viable marriage relationship. The
Court finds that the grounds for divorce should be amended to be mutual irreconcilable differences.
4.

On September 29,2003 (the first day of trial), the Court granted a Decree of Divorce

to the parties to become final upon entry. At such time, the Court ordered Petitioner to temporarily
continue Respondent on his health insurance, under COBRA, and to pay the costs thereof. The
Court continued other prior temporary orders, and reserved other issues for final disposition on the
second day of trial.
5.

No children have been born as issue of the marriage and none are expected.

6.

Shortly after the marriage, the parties moved to San Diego, California, to provide

Respondent with a change of environment. They returned a short time later and lived with
Petitioner's parents. In November, 1999, they purchased a two-bedroom condo in North Salt Lake.
They rented the condo and continued to live with Petitioner's parents. At some point, they moved
into the condo and Respondent continues to reside there under a temporary Court order.
7.

Because of Respondent's financial condition, the condo was purchased in Petitioner's

name alone. They financed the condo with a first mortgage to Countrywide Mortgage and borrowed
$29,000.00 from Petitioner's 401(k) through his employment. The loans are in Petitioner's name,
alone. There is a balance on the first mortgage of $93,946.00, and on the 401 (k) loan ofJj&f&QtfR^*
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The parties stipulated that the condo has a current market value of $ 127,175.00, leaving a net equity
of approximately $8,150.00.
8.

During the course of the marriage up to the time of trial, Petitioner accumulated

approximately $87,425.00 in his 401(k) retirement plan with Skywest.

He also acquired

approximately 937.64 shares of SkyWest stock valued at $17.80 per share. The parties also acquired
various other accounts at Smith Barney and Zions Security.
9.

On March 20, 2002, Petitioner withdrew from the Smith Barney Account

approximately $2,821.00,

and on March 21. 2002 from the

Zions Investment Account

approximately $4,934.66. On March 15,2002, he also withdrew from a Zions Investment Account,
the sum of $9,486.00.
10.

When the parties married, Petitioner was essentially debt-free. Respondent had

considerable debt, and a number of debts had gone to collection. Included among her pre-marital
debts, was an R.C. Willey bill of $3,435.00, higher education (student loan) of $3,514.00, and CTI
(student loan) of $5,687.00. Both of the student loans had gone to collection. The total of these three
debts was approximately $12,636.00.
11.

At some point, the parties decided to borrow money from Petitioner's father to pay

off their debts. They borrowed $26,000.00 from Petitioner's father and paid off Respondent's
premarital debts of some $12,636.00, and other consumer debt that the parties had acquired during
the course of the marriage. The Respondent had agreed, when they borrowed the money, that she
would continue to work outside of the home until the debt was paid. They made regular monthly
payments on the loan and at the time this matter was filed, there was a balance owing in excess of
$9,000.00.

12.

Each of the parties have various items of furniture and fixture and personal items in

their possession. These items were appraised by Mr. Jerry Erkelens, Jr., a professional appraiser.
He placed a value on the items in Petitioner's possession at $2,595.00, and those in Respondent's
possession at $6,551.00. From the testimony, it appeared that the sofa, love seat, and hide-a-bed
in Petitioner's possession were premarital property, and that the computer in Petitioner's possession,
which Mr. Erkelens did not personally inspect, was undervalued by about $500.00. With these
adjustments, the value of those items in Petitioner's possession was approximately $2,435.00.
13.

With respect to the items in Respondent's possession, it appears that the sofa and love

seat were overvalued by about $600.00, the bedroom set by about $ 1,500.00, and that the seventeen
inch TV was a premarital asset. With these adjustments, the value of the items in Respondent's
possession was approximately $4,451.00.
14.

Petitioner has a 1997 Grand Cherokee with a balance owing of approximately

$5,290.00. It has an equity of approximately $1,850.00. Respondent has a 1996 Chevrolet Beretta,
that is free and clear and valued at approximately $2,675.00.
15.

Petitioner is presently employed as a pilot with Sky West Airlines, and was so

employed when the parties married. He has had no additional schooling or training during the course
of the marriage, for which the parties have had to pay. He currently receives a gross salary of
approximately $7,700.00 per month, and net after taxes, health insurance, FIC A. medicare, and loan
payment, of approximately $5,500.00 per month.
16.

Respondent was working full time in a night club when the parties met and were

married in 1996. She had worked steadily up until that time. Respondent also received an associates
degree in legal secretary from Stevens-Henager College in 1992. She tried wor^ia^ffiJ|B^
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profession, but was let go after a short time. Following the parties marriage, Respondent continued
to work full-time, primarily as a receptionist for various businesses. She was an excellent employee
and received several letters of recommendation from her employers. She never experienced any
health or psychological problems which interfered with her employment.
17.

In the Spring of 2001, Petitioner quit her employment and indicated to Petitioner that

she did not want to work any longer, even though they still owed a substantial amount to Petitioner's
father on the loan they had obtained to pay off their debts.
18.

A person working as a legal secretary in our area could expect to make an entry level

wage of approximately $12.00 per hour with an average, after a period of training, of $15.00 per
hour.
19.

A person working as a receptionist in the area, can expect an entry-level wage of

$7.90, but with experience, can expect an average wage of between $8.60 and $ 10.90 per hour. The
training period for such employment would be relatively short.
20.

During the marriage and up until just before trial, Respondent had never sought any

additional training or education, nor had she indicated any desire to do so. The issue of further
education and training is a matter of recent origin, and even up until the time of trial Respondent
had taken no formal steps to pursue any goals in that area. There was no evidence of any prior health
or psychological problems that interfered with Respondent's ability to work. That issue only arose
after this matter was filed and just prior to the trial date. No mention was made of the problem in
any affidavits filed in this matter, nor in the deposition taken in February of 2003.
21.

During the marriage, the parties lived primarily in apartments in Midvale and the
000****^
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Bountiful area. They have always resided in a relatively modest neighborhood
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eventually purchased and resided in is in a similar neighborhood. It is a modest two-bedroom condo
in North Salt Lake with 1300 square feet of living space. The parties also had a very modest lifestyle
with no history of extravagant living expenses, or any particular vacation pattern.
22.

At an order to show cause hearing in September, 2002, in conjunction with this case,

Respondent filed an affidavit through her attorney claiming that her living expenses were $2,140.00
per month. That included the condo payment and a car payment of SI95.00. The car is now paid
for. However, that expense statement did not include the sum of $208.00 per month which would
be required to continue her medical insurance coverage under COBRA.
23.

During the marriage, Petitioner had an arrangement with his brother, who is a

building contractor, whereby he, because of his better credit rating, would co-sign, or in some cases
sign his own name on construction loans for his brother. As part of the agreement, Petitioner would
then be allowed to claim the interest on the construction loan for income tax purposes. That
sometime required title to the property covered by the loan being in his name, either alone or with
his brother as a co-owner. At one time, this also involved an L.L.C. organized by his brother. In
these instances, Petitioner was not involved in the actual construction or any related matters. The
only benefit received, was the tax benefit in which both of the parties participated.
24.

After this Complaint was filed, Petitioner withdrew $2,821.00 from his Smith Barney

account, and $4,934.00 from his Zions investment account, and paid that money along with some
money from an income tax return to his father to pay off the balance of $9,000.00 plus dollars which
the parties owed Petitioner's father on the consolidation loan.
25.

About this same time, Petitioner withdrew approximately $9,400.00 from his Zions

investment account for which he cannot specifically account, except that i
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obligations and ongoing expenses.
26.

All of the experts agreed, that based upon the self-reported symptoms of Respondent,

supported by certain psychological testing, that she does manifest the symptoms of PTSD, but were
unable to indicate the cause.
27.

It was speculated that the source of the symptoms could be a delayed reaction to a

prior difficult marriage of Respondent; her memory or a prior lifestyle coming into conflict with the
present; changed value system; a conflicted relationship between the parties; or the stress of the
present divorce litigation; or a combination of all of these factors.
28.

It was evident from the file and the trial, that Respondent had been actively engaged

in every aspect of the divorce litigation, to the extent that there had been disagreements between
herself and counsel. This has resulted in her changing counsel on three different occasions, the last
time, between the first and second day of trial in this matter. The experts were unable to indicate
how long her symptoms would last, however, both Dr. Cline and Dr. Carol Gage indicated that it
would be good for Respondent to get out and become involved in the work force in some low stress
type of job similar to that of a receptionist.
29.

At trial, Respondent exhibited appropriate demeanor. She appeared very articulate

and knowledgeable, and expressed herself very well. She did not seem to be intimidated in any way
by the trial setting.
30.

The Court found the testimony of Dr. Peterson, a family practitioner, to be less than

credible and objective on the psychological issues because of his lack of formal training in the area,
and because of the advocacy stance taken by him in Respondent's favor.
31.

Petitioner testified that he had living expenses of approximately $2,45 £*^t^-*^-«&w/, - '*
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and that appeared reasonable, except for a claim of $200.00 per month travel, his failure to include
his car payment expense of $207.00, and for utilities in the event that he did not reside in the condo.
The Court finds that utility expenses would reasonably be about $200.00 per month, and that $50.00
would be sufficient for travel expenses. The Court finds that reasonable expenses for Petitioner
would be approximately $2,716.00 including the utility expense, his car payment, and reduced travel
of $50.00 per month.
32.

Respondent testified that she had living expenses of $5,026.00 per month. The Court

finds that those expenses are unreasonable, especially in light of her affidavit claiming expenses of
only $2,141.00 in September, 2002.
33.

The Court finds that Respondent would have reasonable expenses of a house payment

of $898.00, taxes of $72.00, condo fee of $40.00, maintenance fee of $25.00, real property insurance
of $12.00, food and household expenses of $260.00, utilities of $125.00, phoneof $55.00, cell phone
of $40.00, personal care of $ 100.00, medical including COBRA of $208.00, and co-pays for medical
and dental in the amount of $200.00, entertainment of $50.00, gifts of $25.00, auto expenses of
$150.00, installment loans of $250.00, for reasonable expenses of approximately $2,550.00 per
month.
34.

The Court finds that Respondent's claims for additional expenses are both excessive

and speculative.
35.

The Court further finds that Respondent's claim for damage to the condominium in

the approximate sum of $1,400.00, although some of which were claimed to have been caused by
Petitioner, are primarily maintenance issues.
36.

The Court further concludes that each of the parties have incurred attorney fe^ymd
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costs in this matter. Respondent claims attorney fees in the approximate sum of $15,298.00 which
includes $1,430.00 for her first attorney, $6,623.10 for her second attorney, and $5,072.50 for her
third attorney, who represented her for less than two weeks and during the second day of trial. The
Court concludes that this case was not overly complex in terms of either discovery or legal issues;
further that the fees in this matter for both Petitioner and Respondent were increased as a result of
Respondent's decision to employ three different counsel in this case and by including new issues late
in the proceedings. The Court concludes that a reasonable attorney fee for Respondent, but for the
action of Respondent would be $6,500.00. The Court finds that Respondent is without sufficient
funds to pay those fees without invading the assets awarded to her. That in light of Petitioner's
superior earning capacity, he has the ability to contribute toward Respondent's attorney fees. The
Court recognizes that Petitioner has already paid $2,500.00 toward Respondent's attorney fees and
that he has been required to incur additional fees as a result of the actions of Respondent in this
matter, and finds that Respondent should only pay an additional $4,000.00 of Respondent's attorney
fees. The Court finds that each party should bear their own costs.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Decree of Divorce previously granted in this matter should be amended to

provide that the Decree is mutually granted based upon irreconcilable differences.
2.

The sum which accrued in Petitioner's 401 (k) account at Sky West should be valued

as to those sums which accrued during the course of the marriage up to the date of the trial of
September 29,2003, and each of the parties should be awarded one-half thereof. Each of the parties
should be awarded one-half of the Sky West stock, valued on the same date.
3.

Each party should be awarded the vehicles in their possession subject tQ^yjy

4&i

indebtedness thereon. Petitioner should return to Respondent any CD's which he has that belong
to Respondent, and one-half of any CD's that the parties purchased. That should apply to the
Respondent also. The Petitioner should return the T.V. guard to Respondent, if he has it.
4.

Each party should be awarded those items of personal property in their respective

possession. The Court concludes that, based upon the findings of the Court, that the value of those
items in Respondent's possession exceed the value of the items in Petitioner's possession b>
approximately $1,776.00. To equalize those sums, the Court orders that Respondent should bear
the expense of any repairs that need to be made to the condominium as provided by the estimate.
5.

The condominium should be awarded to Respondent subject to the existing first

mortgage in the amount of $93,946.00. The second mortgage loan on Petitioner's 401(k) should
be paid off from the marital 401(k) before it is divided between the parties. That would leave an
equity in the condo of approximately $33,229.00. One half of that should be awarded to Petitioner,
and shall be deducted from Respondent's share of the marital 401(k).
6.

Within 90 days of the date of this order, Respondent should refinance the condo and

take Petitioner's name off of the loan. During the 90 day period. Petitioner should continue to pay
the first mortgage and $ 1,000.00 alimony to Respondent. Petitioner should also continue to pay the
costs of COBRA coverage. The condominium payment should be considered additional alimony.
7.

Respondent should pay the utilities, condo fee, and maintenance, and should

maintain the premises during this period and allow no damage or waste to occur thereto except
normal wear and tear.
8.

If Respondent is unable to refinance the condo within the 90 day period, then the

condo should be awarded to Petitioner on the same terms and conditions as set forth above.

^

9.

Petitioner should pay to Respondent as alimony the sum of $ 1,300.00 per month,

provided however, this should not become effective until after the condominium is refinanced or for
a period of 90 days, whichever occurs first. After that time, this order should become effective.
Alimony should terminate at the end of three years, or by operation of law. whichever occurs first.
The three year period should begin to run on October 1, 2003.
10.

Each party should pay any debt or obligation which that party has incurred since the

date of separation, and should hold the other party harmless.
11.

Petitioner should pay $4,000.00 toward Respondent's attorneys' fees.

12.

Each party should bear their own costs.

n
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NOTICE TO RESPONDENT
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that in accordance with Rule 4-504(2), Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration, the undersigned shall submit the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the Coun for signature and entry upon the expiration of eight {8) days
from the date hereof, unless written notice of your objection thereto is submitted to the Court and
the undersigned prior to that time.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ^ ^ d a y of January, 2004,1 served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law upon the following parties via U.S. mail

Stephen D. Spencer
Attorney at Law
47 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84010
Leslie Dawn Ethington Blosch
Respondent Pro Se
402 North 75 East
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054
Albert B. Blosch
Petitioner
347 West 3500 South
Bountiful Utah 84010
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DAVIS COUNTY, FARMBSGTON DEPARTMENT

ALBERT-BrBLOSGH

DEGREE-OF-DIVORCE-

Petitioner,
v.

Civil Number 024701139DA

LESLIE DAWN ETHINGTON-BLOSCH,
Judge Rodney S. Page
Respondent.

Commissioner David S. Dillon

On September 29, 2003 and November 7, 2003, this case came on for trial before the
Honorable Rodney S. Page. Petitioner appeared personally on both days of trial together with his
attorney of record, Douglas D. Adair. Respondent appeared personally on the first day of trial with
her attorney of record Denise P. Larkin, and on the second day of trial with her subsequent attorney
of record Stephen D. Spencer. During diese two days of trial, the Court had the opportunity to hear
evidence from both Petitioner's and Respondent's witnesses, to consider die admitted exhibits, and
to hear arguments of counsel. Being fully advised in the premises, the Court now enters the
following DECREE OF DIVORCE:
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1.

On October 21, 2003, this Court granted a bifurcated Decree of Divorce to the

parties. The Court granted Petitioner a divorce from Respondent on the grounds of cruelty pursuant
to the request in his Petition. The Court granted Respondent a divorce from Petitioner on the
grounds of irreconcilable differences.

The Court hereby amends this Decree of Divorce to the

mutual grounds of irreconcileable differences.
2.

The Court finds that Petitioner has acquired a marital interest in a Skywest 401(k)

account in the amount of $87,425.00 (which represents the value of the account as of the time of the
first day of trial of September 29, 2003, less Petitioner's pre-marital contribution to the account.)
The Court further finds that Respondent has not acquired any retirement or investment accounts
during the course of the marriage. On this basis, the Court awards each of the parties one half of
the $87,425.00 marital portion of the Skywest 40 l(k) account, subjectto the following adjustments
set forth in the Decree of Divorce. In addition, the Court awards each party one half of the Skywest
Stock held as of the first day of trial of September 29, 2003 (937.64 shares valued at $17.80 per
share.). The Courtfindsthat there are not any other marital investment or retirement accounts subject
to division between the parties and otherwise awards each party any and all of their own investment,
banking, and retirement accounts of any kind.
3.

Each party shall be awarded the vehicle(s) in that party's respective possession

subject to any indebtedness thereon. Therefore, Petitioner is hereby awarded his 1997 Grand
Cherokee, subject to any indebtedness thereon. Respondent is hereby awarded her 1996 Chevrolet
Beretta, subject to any indebtedness thereon. Petitioner shall return to Respondent any compact
discs which he has, that belong to Respondent, and one-half of any compact discs that the parties
purchased. In addition, Respondent shall return to Petitioner any compact discs which she has that
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belong to Petitioner, and one-half of any compact discs that the parties purchased. If he has it,
Petitioner shall return the television guard to Respondent.
4.

Each party is hereby awarded all of the remaining items of personal property in that

party's respective possession, not mentioned above. Based upon itsfindings,the Court concludes
that the value of those marital personal property items in Respondent's possession exceed the value
of the items in Petitioner's possession by approximately $1,776.00. To equalize those sums, the
Court orders that Respondent shall bear the expense of any repairs that need to be made to the
marital condominium as provided by the estimate at trial (which the Court found were primary
maintenance issues.)
5

The Court orders that the marital condominium located at 468 North Frontage Road

North Salt Lake, Utah shall be awarded to Respondent (upon the conditions set forth herein) subject
to the existing Countrywide first mortgage in the amount of $93,946.00, and the second mortgage
loan on Petitioner's 401(k) account which is $25,079.00. After the application of these two loans,
the Court finds that there is an equity interest in the condominium of $33,229.00. One half of this
equity amount shall be awarded to Petitioner, and shall be deducted from Respondent's marital
share of the Skywest 401(k). The Court orders that Respondent shall refinance the Countrywide
first mortgage loan,- and completely remove Petitioner's name of the loan within 90 days of
December 19,2003. Further, the Court orders that the 401 (k) loan shall be paid off from the marital
Skywest 401(k), before the marital portion of the 401(k) is divided between the parties.
6.

Within 90 days of

December 19,

2003,

Respondent shall refinance the

condominium and take Petitioner's name completely off of the loan. During the 90 day period,
Petitioner shall continue to pay the first mortgage on the marital condominium and $1,000.00

ty

monthly alimony to Respondent. During this period, Petitioner shall also continue to pay the costs
of Respondent's COBRA coverage. The marital condominium payment shall be considered
additional alimony.
7.

During the 90 day period, Respondent shall pay the utilities and condominium fee

and maintenance fees, and shall maintain the premises during this period, and shall allow no
damage or waste to occur thereto except normal wear and tear.
8.

If Respondent is unable to refinance the condominium as specified above and within

the 90 day period specified above, then the condominium shall be awarded to Petitioner on the same
terms and conditions as set forth above.
9.

Upon the soonest of the occurrence of either 90 daysfromDecember 19,2003 or the

refinance of the marital condominium whichever first occurs, Petitioner shall begin pay to
Respondent monthly alimony in the amount of $1,300.00 per month in place of the temporary 90 day
period financial obligations set forth above. (Upon the commencement of such payments, Petitioner
shall not have any additional duty to pay any COBRA payments, condominium payments, or any
other payments in relation to Respondent.) Petitioner's monthly alimony obligation shall terminate
upon the soonest of the following events: (a) Three years from the date of October 1, 2003; b)
Respondent's remarriage; c) Respondent's cohabitation; d) Respondent's death.
10.

The parties do not have any joint debts and obligations of any kind. Therefore, each

party shall pay all of their own separate debts or obligation incurred at any time, whether prior to
the marriage, during the marriage, or after the date of the parties' separation.) The Court specifically
denies Respondent's request that Petitioner be responsible for any of the debts which she incurred
during the course of this action, or any of her other debts of any kind, Each party shall hold the
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other party harmless for any such debts.
11.

Based upon the different financial positions of the parties, Petitioner shall pay

$4,000.00-toward_Respondent's attorney fees, in addition to the $2,500.00 which he previously
paid. Otherwise, each party shall be responsible for all of their own court costs, witness costs,
attorney fees, and any other expenses in relation to this action of any kind.
12.

t>ased upon Petitioner's payment of certain portions of the joint marital loan from

Petitioner's father as well as other provisions of this Decree, Petitioner shall not be required to
provide any accounting for any of the sums wnich he withdrew and allocated to various expenses,
either nrior to this action or after the commencement of this action.
13.

The Court orders that neither party shall bother or harass the other party.

14.

Other than the obligation to pay certain COBRA payments as specified above,, neither

party shall have any obligation to cany any kind of insurance of any kind (including but not limited
to life or health) either on their own life or on the other party. Further, each party shall be separately
responsible for any and all of their own health care costs of any kind.
15.

The Court denies Petitioner's request that Respondent be restored to her maiden

name, and allows her to continue to use her present surname of Blosch.
16.

The Court orders that the parties shall file separate tax returns for the tax year of

2003, and for each and every subsequent year thereafter. Further, neitherparty shall make any
claims to any tax proceeds of the other party. Further, neither party shall make any claims against
the other party for any tax liabilities of any kind.
17.

Each party shall cooperate with the other party, in order to execute any documents

to implement the provisions of the instant Decree of Divorce.
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DATED this Zq^

day of

, 2004.

BY THE COURT:
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The Honojajile Rodney,
Second District Court Jc

STATE
OF
UTAH

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
Dated this

day of January, 2004.

Leslie Dawn Ethington Blosch
Respondent Pro Se
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF DAVIS
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.HFREBYCEOTFYTHATTHISISATRUECOPVOFTHI
ORIG.NAL ON FILE IN MY OFFICE

DEPUTY
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NOTICE TO RESPONDENT
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that in accordance with Rule 4-504(2), Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration, the undersigned shall submit the foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE to the Court
for signature and entry upon the expiration of eight (8) days from the date hereof, unless written
notice of your objection thereto is submitted to the Court and the undersigned prior to that time.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ££? day of January, 2004,1 served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Decree of Divorce upon the following parties via U.S. mail

SjepheriD_--Spencer
Attorney at Law
47 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84010
Leslie Dawn Ethington Blosch
Respondent Pro Se
402 North 75 East
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054
Albert B. Blosch
Petitioner
347 West 3500 South
Bountiful, Utah 84010
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